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WHAT IF?
THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE
AND THE LEGAL NEEDS OF LESBIAN AND
GAY MALE COUPLES
David L. Chambers*
Laws that treat married persons in a different manner than they
treat single persons permeate nearly every field of social regulation in
this country - taxation, torts, evidence, social welfare, inheritance,
adoption, and on and on. In this article I inquire into the patterns these
laws form and the central benefits and obligations that marriage entails,
a task few scholars have undertaken in recent years. I have done so be-
cause same-sex couples, a large group not previously eligible to marry
under the laws of any American jurisdiction, may be on the brink of se-
curing the opportunity to do so in Hawaii.' I wanted to know the bene-
fits and burdens that legal marriage might extend to this group and ask
whether the consequences would be sensible and appropriate for same-
sex couples. How, in other words, would this institution, molded over
time for persons of different sexes, apply to those with different
differences?
My findings form the core of this article: that the laws assigning
consequences to marriage today have much more coherence than has
been commonly recognized, largely falling within three sorts of regula-
tion; that each of these three sorts of regulation would, as a whole, fit
the needs of long-term gay male and lesbian couples; that while the law
has changed in recent years to recognize nonmarital relationships in a
* Wade H. McCree, Jr., Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A.
1962, Princeton; LL.B. 1965, Harvard. - Ed. While working on this piece I consulted
many friends and colleagues, but I am particularly grateful to Elizabeth Bartholet,
Steven Homer, William Rubenstein, and Lawrence Waggoner for their close scrutiny of
a draft and for the research assistance of Edward Deibert, Noreen Nash, and Amy
Smith.
1. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), clarified, 852 P.2d 74 (1993). The
court held that Hawaii's law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples was unconstitu-
tional as an impermissible form of sex discrimination under Hawaii's constitution, un-
less the state of Hawaii could demonstrate a compelling justification for limiting mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples. As this article was completed, a trial court, after repeated
postponements, held a hearing in which the state tried to present evidence of a compel-
ling justification.
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variety of contexts, the number of significant distinctions resting on
marital status remains large and durable; that in some significant re-
spects the remaining distinctive laws of marriage are better suited to the
life situations of same-sex couples than they are to those of the
opposite-sex couples for whom they were devised; and, most broadly,
that the package of rules relating to marriage, while problematic in
some details and unduly exclusive in some regards, are a just response
by the state to the circumstances of persons who live together in endur-
ing, emotionally based attachments. Legal marriage, somewhat surpris-
ingly to a person long dubious of the state's regulation of nonviolent
private relationships, has much to be said for it.
I need to make clear what one of my points is not. I do not claim
that, if a new legal code of human or family relationships were devel-
oped completely afresh, governments should continue to sanctify the
two-person enduring union over every other relationship in precisely the
manner they do today. Rather, my claim is that, after thousands of years
of human history, the union of two persons in a relationship called
"marriage" is almost certainly here to stay, that the special rules for
married people serve legitimate purposes, and that gay men and lesbi-
ans should not shrink from embracing them, nor should politicians
shrink from extending them.
Just at the point that I finished this article, Congress acted to limit
the effects that legal marriage would have, if Hawaii or any other state
moved to permit same-sex couples to marry. The new "Defense of
Marriage Act" declares that all federal statutes and regulations that re-
fer to married persons or to spouses shall be read as applying to
opposite-sex couples only.2 This article persists in reviewing both fed-
eral and state laws that bear on married persons, for the purpose of my
exercise of imagination - the "what if?" - is not to explore what will
actually happen if gay couples are permitted to marry in Hawaii, but
rather to ask how opposite-sex married persons are treated under the
law today and hold these laws up to the situations of lesbian and gay
male couples. By the end of the exercise, the meanspiritedness of Con-
gress's actions may be more apparent, for the rules that it has gone out
of its way to deny to same-sex couples are ones that I believe will be
shown to be fully applicable to the lives of most gay men and lesbians
in long-term relationships.
2. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419
(1996).
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I. PosTuRs TOwARD MARRIAGE
A large proportion of American adults who identify themselves as
lesbian or gay live with another person of the same sex and regard that
person as their life partner. Exactly how many gay or lesbian adults
there are in the United States and what proportion live with another in a
long-term relationship are not possible to calculate on the basis of ex-
isting information. Many lesbians and gay men, perhaps most, refuse to
identify their sexuality to strangers who ring their doorbell or call them
on the telephone.3 Still, every survey of adult Americans willing to
identify themselves as lesbian or gay finds that a majority or a near ma-
jority are living currently with a partner.4 Increasing numbers of these
couples are celebrating their relationships in ceremonies of commit-
ment. 5 Those who participate commonly refer to the ceremonies as
weddings and to themselves as married,6 even though they know that
the ceremonies are not legally recognized by the laws of any state. If
states extend the legal right to marry, it is highly probable that large
numbers of gay and lesbian couples would choose to participate. In a
recent survey of nearly 2600 lesbians, for example, seventy percent said
3. In one effort to survey Americans in every state by phone, it took 1650 calls to
Kansas - 55 hours of random dialing - before the pollers found the first person will-
ing to admit being lesbian or gay. See Larry Hatfield, Methods of Polling, S.F. EXAM-
INER, June 5, 1989, at A-20. It is possible, of course, that fewer than one-tenth of one
percent of Kansans are lesbian or gay, but I doubt it.
4. The largest attempt at a random national sampling of Americans willing to iden-
tify as lesbian or gay was by a private polling group in 1989 for the San Francisco Ex-
aminer. See id. In that survey, 64% of lesbians and 60% of gay men said that they were
currently in a relationship. The median length of that current relationship was 2.3 years.
See Larry D. Hatfield, New Poll: How U.S. Views Gays, S.F. EXAMINER, June 6, 1989,
at A-19. In large surveys of its readership by the Advocate, 67% of lesbians and 44% of
gay men reported themselves currently in a relationship with a primary partner. See Ja-
net Lever, Lesbian Sex Survey, ADVOCATE, Aug. 22, 1995, at 29; Janet Lever, The
1994 Advocate Survey of Sexuality and Relationships: The Men, ADVOCATE, Aug. 23,
1994, at 23.
5. The Advocate reports that 46% of women and 30% of men said that they had
exchanged rings or had a commitment ceremony. See Lever, Lesbian Sex Survey, supra
note 4, at 29; see also Suzanne Sherman, Introduction to LESBIAN AND GAY MAR-
RIAGE: PRIVATE COMMrrMENrs, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 1, 5-7 (Suzanne Sherman ed.,
1992) [hereinafter LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE]; CEREMONIES OF THE HEART:
CELEBRATING LESBIAN UNIONS (Becky Butler ed., 1990).
6. See LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 5, at 13 (providing a collection
of interviews with lesbian and gay male couples who have joined in ceremonies of
commitment; most of the couples referred to themselves as married and the ceremony
as a wedding).
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they would marry another woman if same-sex marriage were legally
recognized.
7
Exactly what lesbians and gay men hope to obtain from legal mar-
riage is uncertain. Since public ceremonies of commitment are already
so common, one might expect that when debating state-sanctioned mar-
riage, they would focus on what law itself can accord that other institu-
tions cannot: a range of legally protected benefits and legally imposed
obligations. In fact, they do not. In the vigorous public discussion, few
advocates address at any length the legal consequences of marriage.
William Eskridge, for example, devotes only six of the 261 pages in his
fine new book, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, to the legal conse-
quences, and his, with one exception, is the longest discussion I can
find.8 Whatever the context of the debate, most speakers are transfixed
by the symbolism of legal recognition. It is as if the social significance
of the marriage ceremonies gay people already conduct today count for
nothing - as if, without the sanction of the state, those who marry
have merely been playing dress-up.
That the social meanings of state recognition draw so much atten-
tion is nonetheless understandable. In our country, as in most societies
throughout the world, marriage is the single most significant communal
ceremony of belonging. It marks not just a joining of two people, but a
joining of families and an occasion for tribal celebration and solidarity.
In a law-drenched country such as ours, permission for same-sex
couples to marry under the law would signify the acceptance of lesbians
and gay men as equal citizens more profoundly than any other nondis-
crimination laws that might be adopted. Most proponents of same-sex
marriage, within and outside gay and lesbian communities, want mar-
riage first and foremost for this recognition. 9 Most conservative oppo-
7. See Lever, Lesbian Sex Survey, supra note 4, at 27. In a comparable survey of
gay men, 59% said that they would marry if they could, and another 26% said maybe.
Seventy-one percent of men said they preferred long-term monogamous relationships.
See Lever, Advocate Survey, supra note 4, at 23-24. In the national telephone survey
undertaken for the San Francisco Examiner, 92% of lesbians and gay men indicated ap-
proval when asked, "How do you feel about two people of the same sex living together
as a married couple?" See New Poll, supra note 4, at A-21.
8. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 66-71
(1996); see also HAWAII COMMIssION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
REPORT 1-23 (1995) (discussing the legal consequences of marriage at greater length).
9. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 8; Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek
the Right to Marry, OUTILOOK, NATL. GAY AND LESBIAN Q. Fall 1989, at 9, re-
printed in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 5, at 13; Evan Wolfson, Cross-
ing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-
community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1994-95); Nan D.
Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. & SEXUALrrY Summer
1991, at 9.
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nents oppose it for the same reason. Thus, the conservative legislators
who have promoted the recent legislation in many states that reject
same-sex marriage and the members of Congress who voted for the De-
fense of Marriage Act10 seem motivated not by a view of the inappro-
priateness of extending particular legal entitlements to same-sex couples
but by views about some "inherent" meaning of marriage and by views
about the social unacceptability of gay people and gay relationships.
Skeptics about marriage within the lesbian and gay communities
also largely ignore the legal consequences of marriage. They focus in-
stead on the negative meanings they attach to the institution itself. To
many, marriage signifies hierarchy and dominance, subjugation and the
loss of individual identity." To them, it marks a tombstone over the
graves of countless generations of married couples: one stone reads
"Herbert Smith," the other simply reads "Wife." And even if the legal
institution of marriage has changed in the recent past, they resist the as-
similation of queer couples into an oppressive heterosexual orthodoxy
of ascribed roles and domesticity.12
When skeptics about marriage within lesbian and gay communities
do focus on the legal consequences of marriage - and they occasion-
ally do - some express considerable misgivings. In the introduction to
her collection of interviews with lesbians and gay men who have united
in ceremonies of commitment, Suzanne Sherman writes with admiration
of the couples she encountered, but also expresses doubts about mar-
riage as a legal institution: "I don't believe that tax breaks and other
benefits should be attached to marital status."' 13 In her view, the subject
of the law ought to be the individual, not the couple. Many of her inter-
viewees seemed to agree. They treasured their partners, but expressed
distrust of the state. If state laws permitted same-sex marriage, many
10. In the wake of the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court, sixteen states have
adopted laws declaring that their state does not recognize same-sex marriages even if
conducted validly in another state or that, for their state's purposes, the only valid mar-
riages are marriages of a man and a woman. See Forum on the Right to Marry (visited
Aug. 12, 1996) <FORUMBOSTON@aol.com>; see also Ronald Smothers, Mississippi
Governor Bans Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1996, at A6. For the federal
statute, see supra note 2.
11. See Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation,
OUT/LOOK, NATL. GAY AND LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted in LESBIAN
AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 5, at 20; Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask
For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Struc-
ture of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
12. See RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE
RULE OF LAW 124-27 (1992); sources cited supra note 11.
13. Sherman, Introduction to LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 5, at 1,
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said that they would marry to obtain the benefits now given to opposite-
sex couples, but the tone of their comments sometimes suggested that
the bounty that accrues to married people is undeserved or inappropri-
ate.' 4 They speak of it in much the same way that they might speak of
the perks of the overpaid chief executive of a large corporation.
Nancy Polikoff, a law professor and scholar who is critical of ef-
forts by gay and lesbian advocates to pursue legalized marriage, views
the benefits that attach to heterosexual marriage in much the same way.
Of the economic benefits, she writes:
For those who support lesbian and gay marriage because it would allow
us access to the package of benefits now associated with heterosexual
marriage ... advocating lesbian and gay marriage is an obvious choice. I
do not share that vision. Advocating lesbian and gay marriage will de-
tract from, even contradict, efforts to unhook economic benefits from
marriage and make basic health care and other necessities available to
all.'5
Polikoff alludes to health care as a specific example of a social
good that she believes is inappropriately linked to marital status. She
chooses her example well. She and many others, including myself, be-
lieve that a wealthy industrialized state should seek to assure decent
health care to all individuals in their own right and not derivatively
through a spouse or parent.' 6 But health care is only one among dozens
of contexts in which married people are treated in a distinctive manner
in this country. Looking across the broader range, most gay and lesbian
writers about same-sex marriage disagree with Polikoff.' 7 Without de-
voting much space to their positions, most accept the appropriateness of
attaching legal consequences to marital status and conclude that the
benefits of marriage would be of enduring value to gay and lesbian
couples. This article considers both questions more closely.
I1. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE
Each of the fifty states defines the incidents of marriage for its re-
sidents. Federal laws add hundreds of other legal consequences. Some
scholars have characterized the multitude of legal attributes of marriage
14. See, e.g., LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 5, at 108, 146.
15. Polikoff, supra note 11, at 1549; see also Homer, supra note 11, at 515-16.
16. In fact, access to health care has been "hooked" to marital status in this coun-
try largely by the action of private employers, not because it has been mandated by
governments.
17. See sources cited supra note 15. For a response to Polikoff's arguments about
health care, see Wolfson, supra note 9, at 604-08.
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today as largely incoherent, 18 and in their details they surely are. Yet,
for all the variation among laws, it is possible to identify three central
categories of regulation, within each of which a certain coherence ob-
tains: some laws recognize affective or emotional bonds that most peo-
ple entering marriage express for each other; some build upon assump-
tions about marriage as creating an environment that is especially
promising or appropriate for the raising of children; and some build on
assumptions (or prescriptive views) about the economic arrangements
that are likely to exist (or that ought to exist) between partners. The re-
view that follows makes no attempt to describe all of these regulations
but provides central examples of each sort.
As you read, you will encounter occasional ghosts from an authori-
tarian and formally gendered past. The laws dealing with married per-
sons have undergone a massive transformation during the last century.19
Well into the nineteenth century, all assets of a married couple, includ-
ing those that the wife brought into a marriage, were controlled by the
husband. In fact, her personal property became his property. The hus-
band also, as a matter of law, controlled all decisions that related to a
married couples' children. Many of these laws continued well into this
century. In many states, for example, as late as the 1950s, the state of a
married woman's residence was fixed by law as the state of her hus-
band's residence. If the husband unilaterally decided to move "his"
family to another place without consulting with his wife and the wife
chose not to come with him, she became subject to divorce for deser-
tion.20 This male-controlled relationship was also difficult or impossible
to leave. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, marriage was in-
dissoluble under the laws of nearly all states. Later in the century, it
was dissoluble, but only on proof by one sinless spouse of a serious
18.
[Clontemporary marriage cannot be legally defined any more precisely than as
some sort of relationship between two individuals, of indeterminate duration, in-
volving some kind of sexual conduct, entailing vague mutual property and sup-
port obligations, a relationship which may be formed by consent of both parties
and dissolved at the will of either.
1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 2.1, at 81 (2d ed. 1988).
19. For a history of the early law, see MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986). For accounts of the changes, see
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW (1989); MARY
ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); MAX
RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW (1972); Carl E.
Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1803 (1985).
20. See CLARK, supra note 18, § 4.3, at 268-69; see also Franklin v. Franklin, 77
N.E. 48 (Mass. 1908).
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marital sin committed by the other. The partners could not end their re-
lationship and remarry even if they both wished to do so.
Today, legislatures or judicial decisions have removed virtually all
rules that explicitly provide different status or authority for husbands.
They also permit marriage to end without proof of marital fault. The
compulsory and sex-linked aspects of the law of marriage have, during
the latter half of this century, been withering away,21 sometimes at the
price of providing insufficient protection to women economically ill-
positioned to protect themselves. For many women in opposite-sex mar-
riages, the promise of equality and autonomy remains largely empty,
because other social and institutional structures within our culture con-
tinue to enforce their subordination. 22 As we will see, for example, the
rules of divorce commonly treat marriage as a partnership with an equal
division of property, but, because of their lower earnings, women are
generally left significantly worse off financially than men are. Most gay
and lesbian couples can, however, appropriately regard the legal aspects
of marriage today as serving primarily, though not entirely, a facilitat-
ing function - offering couples opportunities to shape satisfying lives
as formal equals and as they, rather than the state, see fit.2
3
A. Regulations that Recognize Emotional Attachments
Some laws and regulations dealing expressly with married persons
can best be viewed today as promoting the emotional attachments that
most spouses feel toward each other. There are not a great many such
laws. And among the handful are some that plainly have historical ori-
gins in a time when legislatures and judges conceived of marriage not
primarily as a romantic bond but rather as a construct for the control of
property and progeny. Still, for this article - the purpose of which is to
reveal the current functions that laws of marriage serve - these rules
can best be seen as facilitators of the affective aspects of couples'
relationships.
Here are a few examples. Statutes or common law doctrine in all
states grant decisionmaking powers to relatives when a person becomes
incompetent to make decisions for herself. Two broadly different sorts
21. See, e.g., GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note
19; MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993);
Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage & the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L.
REv. 663 (1976); Schneider, supra note 19.
22. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 36-52 (1991).
23. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 495, 497 (1992) (discussing the facilitative function of American family law).
[Vol. 95:447
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of laws exist. The more narrow sort authorizes a family member to
make an emergency medical decision when a person has become in-
competent and has failed to execute a formal document authorizing
some other person to make decisions on her behalf. When such incapac-
ity arises for an unmarried person, state laws designate a parent or an
offspring or some other blood relation as decisionmaker, but, for per-
sons who are married, they typically turn first to the person's spouse.24
The second sort of law, broader in scope, provides for the formal ap-
pointment of a "guardian" or "conservator," who typically makes not
only medical decisions but other decisions about residence, care, and fi-
nancial matters. These statutes also differ widely, but commonly pro-
vide first for the appointment of a blood relative for a single person and
a spouse for a married person. The Uniform Probate Code, for example,
has been adopted in fourteen states, and establishes an order of prefer-
ence for the appointment of relatives as the guardian for an incapaci-
tated person, with the spouse first in line, followed by an adult child or
a parent.25 Upon death, other laws or court decisions provide that the
spouse has first right as "next of kin" to claim a person's remains26 and
to make anatomical gifts of parts of the deceased person's body when
the deceased person has made no directive of her own. 27
In a similar manner, state laws designate the spouse as the person
to receive part or all a married person's assets when he or she dies
without a will.28 These "intestacy" laws vary widely among the states.29
In some states, if there are surviving children, a spouse receives as little
as a third; in many others, a fixed dollar amount and a share of the re-
24. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 311.631 (Michie Supp. 1994) (listing, in order,
the spouse, an adult child, a parent).
25. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-305(c) (guardian of the person), § 5-409(a)
(guardian of property), 8 U.L.A. 466, 487-88 (1983); see also Amy L. Brown, Note,
Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmar-
ried Adults, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 1029, 1045-47 (1990).
26. See, e.g., New Mexico Disposition of Dead Bodies Act, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-12-1 to -4 (Michie 1994).
27. See UNim. ANATOMICAL GwFr AcT § 3(a), adopted in some form in every
state; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALT LAW § 4301(2) (McKinney 1996).
28. See M. HENNER, A COMPENDIUM OF STATE STATUTES AND INTERNA-
TIONAL, TREATIES IN TRUST AND ESTATE LAW (1985). The rules about intestate suc-
cession also reflect legislative views about the financial obligations of spouses to each
other. See infra section llI.C.
29. As a starting point, intestacy laws "build upon the rules that allocate original
ownership" during the marriage. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in
Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv. 21, 27 (1994). As we will discuss later, two quite different
regimes of marital property ownership exist within the United States. See infra text ac-
companying notes 115-20.
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mainder; in still others, the entire estate.30 In most states, if there are no
surviving children and no surviving parents, the spouse receives
everything.3
The laws relating to incompetency and death serve fairly obvious
functions but ones worth explicit recognition. Some relate to the control
of property, a subject taken up later. But most fundamentally, for
couples who see themselves in an enduring relationship, the spouse is
the appropriate person for the state to designate as decisionmaker dur-
ing a period of incompetency and as primary beneficiary after death on
the basis of a reasonable guess that that is the person whom the now-
incompetent or deceased person would have chosen if she had ad-
dressed the question in advance.32 That is, the rule fulfills her probable
wishes. When commentators criticize the current intestacy rules, they
do so primarily on the ground that, in many states, the rules give a sur-
viving spouse less than the evidence suggests that most people would
want their spouse to receive.33 As to decisionmaking about medical and
financial matters, the spouse is also more likely than any other person
to know what decisions the incompetent person would have made if she
were now able to decide for herself or, alternatively, at least to be the
person most concerned about the incompetent person's welfare. Al-
though many spouses rarely discuss such forbidding contingencies, the
state surely has available to it no other more appropriate person to des-
ignate as the default decisionmaker.
Do gay men and lesbians with partners need the protection of such
laws to ensure that their partners make decisions for them or inherit
their estates? A very few states designate a long-term unmarried partner
as the most preferred decisionmaker for the incompetent person, but
30. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution
at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 Am. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 319, 357-58 nn.128-29; Waggoner, supra note 29, at 37-38 (describing changes
in the Uniform Probate Code in 1990 providing that the spouse receives the entire estate
even when there are surviving children, so long as the children are the children of the
decedent and the surviving spouse has no descendants who are not the decedent's).
31. In Europe and the United States, intestate succession laws have progressively
moved toward reducing or excluding shares for blood relatives when the person who
died has a surviving spouse. See GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY
LAW, supra note 19, at 238-40.
32. The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code, for example, explicitly sought to
ground intestacy rules on their best estimation of what people who do not write wills
would most prefer. See Waggoner, supra note 29, at 29, 36-38.
33. See Fellows et al., supra note 30, at 351 (noting that in a phone survey of 750
married persons in 5 states, 71% said that they wanted their surviving spouse to inherit
their entire estate.).
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most states ignore the unmarried partner altogether.34 Similarly, only a
very few states provide that an unmarried partner shall receive any por-
tion of the estate of a person who dies without a will and, to date, no
state provides anything for a same-sex partner.35 Despite this, one could
argue that gay couples do not need such protections because they can
protect themselves fully by simply executing a will or a medical power
of attorney. But gay men and lesbians who are in relationships need
these protections for the same reason that heterosexual persons need
them. Like most heterosexuals, 36 most gay men and lesbians are reluc-
tant to think about their mortality and procrastinate about remote con-
tingencies. They fail to execute wills and powers of attorney, even
though they are often aware of the unfortunate consequences of failing
to act.
37
These consequences are often doubly unfortunate for gay men and
lesbians with partners. When they fail to write a will or execute a
power of attorney, the consequence is not simply that the state will de-
cline to choose as decisionmaker or heir the person in the world they
34. Section Five of The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1993) gives priority
over everyone except a spouse to "an individual in a long-term relationship ... with
the patient in which the individual has demonstrated an actual commitment to the pa-
tient similar to the commitment of a spouse and in which the individual and the patient
consider themselves to be responsible for each other's well being." As of 1996, the Act
had been adopted in a few states. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5B(2) (Michie
Supp. 1996). Arizona has recently adopted a statute that provides that a patient's "do-
mestic partner" can be designated by a court as the surrogate decisionmaker for an in-
competent person, but such a person is given lower priority than an adult child or a par-
ent. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231 (1995).
35. Oregon treats in the same manner as a surviving spouse a person who for the
10 years preceding the decedent's death was in a relation with the decedent in which
they "mutually assumed marital rights, duties and obligations," although they must also
acquire a reputation as "husband and wife." OR. REv. STAT. § 112.017(2) (1995); see
also Waggoner, supra note 29. Waggoner is the reporter for the Uniform Probate Code
and has recently recommended that intestate successions laws be amended to provide
for unmarried partners whose relationship is well-documented or convincingly demon-
strated. See id. at 78. Professor Waggoner has recently prepared a further revised ver-
sion that he can provide by request, at the University of Michigan Law School.
36. See Fellows et al., supra note 30, at 337-39 (reporting that in a survey of 750
adults, 55% of those interviewed said that they did not have a will, and laziness was the
most commonly cited reason).
37. See KAREN THOMPSON & JuLm ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON
KowALSKI CoME HoME? (1988) (relating the story of Sharon Kowalski, a young wo-
man who had failed to execute a power of attorney before a severely debilitating car ac-
cident, and whose lover was excluded by Sharon's parents from playing any role in her
care). One of the gay men interviewed by Suzanne Sherman who had united with a
partner in a ceremony of commitment said, "We haven't put together a will yet, but
we're planning to do it," and his partner conceded, "we won't get motivated until
something forces us to." They had been married for five years. LESBIAN AND GAY
MARRiAGE, supra note 5, at 208.
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(probably) most trust and love. It is also that the persons who will make
the decisions or inherit - most probably biological parents or siblings
- are more likely than for heterosexual persons to be estranged from
the gay person. In the context of medical decisions, when a gay person
is disabled, the biological relations who will make decisions are more
likely than for heterosexual persons to decline even to consult with the
partner.
38
Even if all persons with a same-sex partner remembered to execute
the proper documents and had access to the needed legal services, other
forms of government regulation that recognize special emotional and
spiritual ties could not be similarly handled by a scheme of private des-
ignations. Consider four examples. Federal law places severe restric-
tions on the opportunities for foreign-born nationals to immigrate le-
gally to the United States. One significant exception to this rule of
exclusion is that a foreign-born national who enters into a nonfraudulent
marriage with an American citizen has a presumptive right to enter the
United States immediately as a long-term resident.39 No such special
provisions are made for a friend or lover. Even brothers or parents of a
U.S. citizen are not automatically entitled to preferential treatment, but
typically face long waiting periods before entry. Recent changes pro-
posed by a Congressional commission would widen the difference be-
tween the favored treatment of the noncitizen spouse and the treatment
of other relatives a citizen would wish to bring in - retaining the full
advantages for the spouse and for minor children, but ending all prefer-
ences for siblings and adult children. 40 The lover is still left out. The
spousal preference is a reflection in law of the profound social signifi-
cance attached to marriage, a relationship that transcends national
boundaries.
Another federal law, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
requires all employers with fifty or more employees to extend unpaid
leave of up to twelve work weeks during each year to an eligible em-
38. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients and AIDS: Some Notes From the
Trenches, 49 OrIo ST. LJ. 883 (1989). Moreover, even when gay persons do execute a
will or power of attorney, blood relatives may be more likely to challenge their compe-
tence in making the documents and more likely to allege that their lover had exercised
improper influence. See id. at 892; Jeffrey Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosex-
ual Testator, 42 U. PrrT. L. Rnv. 225 (1981).
39. See 2 CHARLEs GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE,
§ 36.02 (1996). There is also a narrow context in which marriage hurts. Under current
rules, an American citizen can secure a preference for entry as a resident for his for-
eign-bom child, if, but only if, the child is not married. See id. § 36.04[2].
40. See U.S. COMMN. ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SET-
TING PRioRTiEs 48-75 (1995).
[Vol. 95:447
HeinOnline  -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 458 1996-1997
Same-Sex Marriage
ployee to care for a spouse with a "serious health condition. ' 41 The
statute also provides for leaves to care for children and for parents, but
makes no provision of any kind for friends, lovers, or unmarried
partners.
The federal government and many states also extend an advantage
to married people when called to testify in a criminal proceeding that
bars the state from forcing a married person to testify against his or her
spouse.42 Nearly all states offer a related protection, typically in both
civil and criminal proceedings, for confidential communications made
between spouses during the marriage.43
Finally, under the law of many states, if a third person injures a
married person negligently and by so doing deprives the spouse of care
and companionship, the spouse can typically sue the injuring party for
what is called loss of "consortium," compensation not for financial loss
but for the loss of companionship."4
The immigration preference for spouses, the family leave provi-
sions, the evidentiary rules, and the consortium rules have a common
current justification: that it is fitting for the state to recognize the signif-
icance in people's lives of one especially important person to whom
they are not biologically related. The rules both recognize roles that al-
ready exist - the spouse as soulmate, caretaker, and confidant - and
reinforce the legitimacy of the performance of those roles. Lesbians and
gay men in long-term relationships attribute a similar level of impor-
tance to their partners45 (even if they have other gay and lesbian friends
they also consider significant).46 They need these rules as much as het-
erosexual people do. It may well be, for example, that only a small pro-
portion of American lesbians and gay men will wish to marry a foreign
national and bring that person back to live in the United States, but, for
those who do, it is hard to imagine a more important governmental
benefit.
41. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2654, 2612(a)(1)(C) (1994).
42. See KENNE S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 66 (John
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and
the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REv. 2045, 2052-54 (1995).
43. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 78-86, at 112-119.
44. See I CLARK, supra note 18, § 12.5, at 672-83.
45. Measuring attachment or love is difficult, of course, since scientists have not
yet developed an attachometer. For what it's worth, lesbians, gay men, and heterosexu-
als in long-term relationships score at similarly high levels on standardized instruments
asking questions about their liking or love of their partners. See Letitia Anne Peplau,
Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in HoMOSExuALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY 177, 181-83 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991).
46. See generally KATH WESTON, FAMmms WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS,
KiNsmn 117-29 (1991); LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 5.
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Gay men and women would experience as a burden, not as a bene-
fit, a few regulations that attach to marriage and that also build, in sub-
stantial part, on assumptions about the emotional salience of the marital
relationship. Public and private employers, for example, adopt antine-
potism regulations that prohibit employees from participating in deci-
sions to hire, promote, or discharge their spouse or from supervising
their spouse in the workplace.47 Resting on views about both emotional
and economic ties, these regulations are as justifiably imposed on lesbi-
ans and gay men in enduring relationships as they are on heterosexuals:
no one can be expected to be sufficiently objective when decisions
about one's own long-term partner must be made.
Similarly burdensome, at least for some couples, are old laws that
make adultery a crime s and old laws that make adultery a ground for
divorce in the states that retain both fault and no-fault grounds.49 Many
lesbians and gay men will find state-imposed fidelity repugnant on
more than one ground. They will do so in part because they reject the
notion of criminalizing any voluntary sexual conduct between adults. 0
They will also reject the legitimacy of state-dictated terms of the inti-
mate relationship between partners. Most gay men and lesbians within
couples prize loyalty and fidelity, but many would resist the notion that
the test of fidelity - indeed the sole test in the law - turns on whom
one has sex with. Many gay men and lesbians, particularly gay men, ex-
plicitly disavow sexual exclusivity within their long-term relation-
ships.5' Thus, in those states that still have rules relating to adultery,
some lesbians and gay men may find their taint a significant impedi-
ment to embracing legal marriage. As a practical matter, these rules are
47. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3110 (1994) (prohibiting any federal official from em-
ploying, promoting, or advancing any of a list of family members in or to a position in
an agency in which he serves or over which he exercises control); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 8-31-103 (1993) (prohibiting state employees from being placed in the direct line of
supervision of a relative).
48. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1994).
49. See Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 27
FAM. L.Q. 515, 661 (1994) (listing 30 states that retain fault grounds as an alternative
way to obtain a divorce).
50. Hence, all gay organizations oppose sodomy laws.
51. See DAVID P. MCWHIRTER & ANDREW M. MATrISON, THE MALE COUPLE
252-59 (1984) (noting that in a study of 172 male couples, only seven couples had a to-
tally monogamous sexual relationship); see also PILip BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER
ScHwARTz, AMERICAN COUPLES 271-72 (1983) (finding that, among heterosexual
couples, 75% of husbands and 84% of wives believed it was important to be monoga-
mous; 71% of lesbians in couples thought so as well, but only 36% of gay men in
couples considered it important to be monogamous). For some couples, enforced exclu-
sivity might weaken rather than strengthen their bonds to their partners. See id. at 299-
302.
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rarely invoked today - prosecutors bring almost no criminal cases for
adultery and the great majority of divorcing spouses rely on no-fault
grounds - but the emblematic meaning of these old rules may still be
troublesome.
B. Regulations Dealing with Parenting
Gay male and lesbian couples raise children in this country in
three common contexts. In the first, numerically the most common, one
of the partners has already become the biological parent of a child (usu-
ally in the course of a prior relationship with a person of the opposite
sex) and then has later formed a relationship with a same-sex partner.
This new partner is functionally in the position of a "stepparent." In
the second context, a same-sex couple, after beginning a relationship,
agree to raise a child together. They plan that one of them will be the
biological parent and that, after birth, they will serve as co-parents. In
the third context, a same-sex couple seeks to adopt or to become the
foster parents of a child who is biologically related to neither of them.
Opposite-sex couples also raise children in each of these sorts of
contexts and, in each, laws and practices in all states treat such couples,
when married, in specially favored ways. By contrast, in each of the
three situations, a gay or lesbian partner who is not the biological par-
ent of the child typically faces formidable, often insuperable, difficulties
in becoming recognized as a legal parent at all. The laws that advantage
married couples are needed by some heterosexual married couples who
wish to raise children, but these same laws would be helpful to almost
all lesbian and gay male couples who wish to raise a child as legal
equals because, for them, it is always the case that neither partner or
only one is the biological parent of the child.52 Oddly, in the writings of
others on the consequences that legal marriage would offer for same-
sex couples, almost no attention is given to the special rules regarding
parenting.
53
I will discuss each of these three contexts separately. In each, most
of the rules would be defended today as intending to serve the best in-
terests of children. I will focus on the value of these rules both for chil-
dren and for lesbian and gay male adults who wish to raise children. As
to the interests of children, a great deal has been written on the ade-
52. Two lesbians may each be biological parents of a single child when one con-
tributes the egg and the other performs gestation. Even here there is necessarily a third
biological parent.
53. Eskridge, for example, devotes only two sentences to laws regarding parenting.
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 8, at 67.
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quacy of gay men and lesbians as parents in the past two decades, much
of it suffering from the inevitable difficulty of identifying random sam-
ples of gay persons for any purpose. I do not intend to review this liter-
ature. It is well reported elsewhere.54 In overwhelming measure, it con-
cludes that a person's sexual orientation has no significant bearing on
her or his parenting capacities or skills and that children raised by les-
bian and gay male parents fare as well day by day and over time as
children raised by other parents.55 For purposes of this essay, I simply
assume that the parenting capacities of gay and lesbian couples have
been established.
56
As we will see, some of the difficulties currently experienced by
gay men and lesbians who wish to raise children are not formally im-
posed by law. Some arise under rules that courts and agencies already
have the discretion to extend to gay people or to same-sex couples, but
rarely do. Thus, in some contexts, the benefits of legal marriage for
same-sex couples may lie less in the rules that would become applica-
ble to them than in a changed attitude toward homosexual persons that
54. For a brief review, accessible to lawyers, of the research on gay men and les-
bians as parents and for abundant references to the social science literature, see Gregory
M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Re-
search, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133, 157-61 (1991); see also Charlotte J. Patterson, Chil-
dren of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHiLD DEv. 1025 (1992). On lesbians as parents,
see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEo. L. 459 (1990). On gay men as parents, see Frederick W. Bozett, Gay Fathers: A
Review of the Literature, 18 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 137 (1989).
55. See Patterson, supra note 54. Here, for example, is a very recent capsule state-
ment summarizing research on lesbians as parents:
Researchers who compared children raised in lesbian and heterosexual house-
holds found few or no differences in the development of gender identity, gender-
role behavior, or sexual orientation. Studies have also found no deficits among
children of lesbian mothers in other aspects of personal development, including
separation-individuation, locus of control, self-concept, intelligence, or moral
judgment. In addition, numerous studies have shown that children raised by lesbi-
ans have normal, healthy relationships with other children as well as with adults.
According to Patterson's ... comprehensive literature review on lesbian and gay
families, a child's adjustment is enhanced when the lesbian mother lives with her
partner, when the lesbianism is acknowledged before the child reaches adoles-
cence, and when the child has contact with peers from other lesbian families.
Nanette Gartrell et a., The National Lesbian Family Study, 66 AM. . OF ORTHOPSY-
cHIATRY 272, 272-73 (1996) (citations omitted).
56. A second question that bears on some issues - such as whether to permit gay
and lesbian couples to adopt a child that is biologically related to neither - is whether
the breakup rate of gay and lesbian couples is so high that whatever preference is ac-
corded to married heterosexual couples as couples should not be accorded to gay and
lesbian couples. I can find no figures yet on the average duration of relationships of
same-sex couples who have performed ceremonies of commitment or consider them-
selves married.
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a change in marriage laws might help bring about on the part of legal
actors exercising authorities that already exist. Here the symbolic and
the legal intertwine.
1. The Stepparent Relationship
When a lesbian or gay male parent with custody of a child begins
to live with another person of the same sex, the new person assumes a
parenting role functionally comparable to a stepparent. The state of the
law about such parenting relationships outside of marriage is clear: no
matter how long the gay "stepparent" lives with the child, no matter
how deeply she becomes involved in the care of the child, she and the
child will rarely be recognized as having a legally significant relation-
ship with one another.5 7 The state of the law is essentially the same for
stepparent figures in opposite-sex unmarried couples. They are just the
"boyfriend" or "girlfriend" or "live in" of the custodial parent and
have no legal significance.
Perhaps surprisingly, until the recent past, the legal position of the
opposite-sex partner who marries a custodial parent has been little dif-
ferent. In all but a few states, the stepparent married to a biological par-
ent has not been legally obliged to contribute to the support of the child
during the marriage.58 In no state has the stepparent been required to
contribute to the child's support upon divorce, no matter how long he
lived with the child or the extent of his voluntary contributions. The
stepparent has also had no legal entitlement upon divorce to be consid-
ered for court-ordered visitation or for sole or joint custody of the
child.59 It has been the absent biological parent who remained finan-
cially liable for support, who remained the one parent eligible for visita-
tion (even if he never lived with the child), and who remained second
in line for custody.
Recently, however, stepparents married to a custodial parent are
coming to be recognized as parent figures for at least some purposes,
and it is to the benefits of these laws and court decisions that gay and
57. To be sure, the biological parent may designate the partner in her will as the
preferred guardian for the child upon her death, a preference that will often be honored
by the court unless the other biological parent demands custody.
58. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 13-51 (1994).
Utah, for example, is a partial exception, imposing a duty of support during the course
of the stepparent's marriage to the biological parent, but not at the point of divorce. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1992); see also David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Bio-
logic Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of "Family" After Divorce, in DIVORCE RE-
FORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102, 108-09 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay
eds., 1990).
59. See MAHONEY, supra note 58, at 124-48 (1994).
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lesbian "stepparents" need access. A few states have begun, for exam-
ple, to protect the relationship between a child and a stepparent whose
marriage to the biological parent comes to an end. No state has imposed
on the stepparent a general obligation of support upon divorce, but
some courts and a few legislatures have given courts the authority to
grant visitation and, in unusual circumstances, custody, even over the
objection of the biological parent.60
States have also expanded the opportunities for stepparents during
their marriage to a biological parent to become the full legal parent of a
stepchild through adoption. If the absent biological parent consents,
most states permit the married stepparent to adopt without any of the
home visits and family studies usually required as a part of the adoption
process.61 Consensual stepparent adoptions now account for over half of
all adoptions that occur in the United States.62 Within the last few de-
cades, most states have recognized certain circumstances in which step-
parents living with and married to a biological parent are permitted to
adopt even over the objection of the absent biological parent.63 They
have done so in circumstances in which the absent parent is found to
have abandoned his relationship with the child by failing to visit or, in
some states, willfully failing to pay support. Whichever route a steppar-
ent takes to adoption, at the point the adoption occurs, the biological
parent ceases to have any legally recognized relationship to the child
and the adopting parent assumes all the rights and responsibilities.
6 4
A further change regarding stepparents is found in laws relating to
employment in the labor force. State worker's compensation programs65
and the federal Social Security survivor benefit program66 permit a mi-
nor stepchild living with and dependent upon a stepparent to receive
benefits after the stepparent's death. These programs replace much of
the income lost to a child upon the death of the supporting stepparent.
Similarly, the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 requires
60. See id.
61. See Joan H. Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, in ADOP-
TION LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 1.05(2) (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1990).
62. See Joan H. Hollinger, Consent to Adoption, in ADOPTION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, supra note 61, § 2.10(3).
63. See id.; see also Chambers, supra note 58, at 102, 118-21.
64. See 2 CLARK, supra note 18, §§ 21.1, at 565.
65. See id. § 21.12, at 688-89.
66. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal Law, 48 U. PrrT. L,
REv. 491, 496-514 (1987); Mary Ann Mason & David W. Simpson, The Ambiguous
Stepparent: Federal Legislation in Search of a Model, 29 FAMILY L.Q. 445, 457-60
(1994).
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employers to permit a worker to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid
leave to care for their seriously ill child, including a stepchild. 67
Despite these reforms that apply to stepparents married to a biolog-
ical parent, unmarried stepparent figures, of the same or opposite sex as
the custodial parent, remain almost totally ignored by the law, wholly
ineligible, for example, for the special treatment for stepparent adop-
tion, wholly unable to secure for a child the benefits of workers' com-
pensation or Social Security survivor benefits, and ineligible for the
protections of the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act. They also re-
main free of the legal obligations that would come with adoption -
most notably the obligation to provide financial support for the child
they adopt - but these are obligations that many gay and lesbian step-
parent figures would be pleased to accept. Extending these benefits and
obligations to lesbians and gay men by permitting them to marry would
serve well their needs and the needs of their children for the same rea-
sons that they serve the needs of married opposite-sex couples and their
children: children who live with a stepparent figure who is in a commit-
ted relationship with their biological parent often become attached to
and financially dependent upon the stepparent, and these attachments
warrant recognition. To be sure, for the benefit of children, states might
also wisely recognize the strong emotional attachments that children de-
velop to persons to whom their parent is not married but, until the law
so expands, the recognition of legal marriage for same-sex couples at
least will offer greater protection to one group of children today.
2. Artificial Insemination, Sperm Donors, and Surrogacy
The second parenting context for gay men and lesbians includes
the same-sex couple, already formed, who agree that one of them will
become the biological parent of a child whom they will raise together.
Here the issues are rather different for women than for men.
When a lesbian couple plan that one of them will become pregnant
and large numbers of lesbian couples have babies today in this man-
ner68 - they first must find a source of sperm. Some face problems that
are not formal barriers of law but that are probably aggravated by the
67. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(12) & 2612(a)-(d) (1994). The act includes "stepchild"
but does not define the term. I assume from its use in other legal contexts that, for pur-
poses of the act, a stepchild is a child of a person to whom the employee is actually
married and does not include the child of a person with whom the employee is cohab-
iting outside of marriage.
68. See generally APRIL MARTIN, THE LEsBIAN AND GAY PARENTING HAND-
BOOK: CREATING AND RAISING OUR FAmILIES (1993); CHERI PIEs, CONSIDERING
PARENTHOOD (2d ed. 1988).
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outlaw status of their relationship. Sperm banks in all states provide in-
semination services to women, most commonly in circumstances in
which the woman is married and her husband is sterile. While no state
expressly prohibits sperm banks from providing services to unmarried
women or to lesbians,69 some doctors and sperm banks apparently de-
cline to do so.70
Clearly legal problems arise after birth, at the point that the lesbian
partner seeks to become recognized as a legal parent.7' She will be able
to achieve such recognition only if she successfully completes a formal
process of adoption. In most states, her petition to adopt will be re-
jected, either because her partner and she are of the same sex,72 or be-
cause they are not married to one another,73 or both. In a growing num-
ber of states, the lesbian partner can be considered for adoption,74 but
even in these states, the best the couple can hope for is that, after com-
pleting elaborate forms and enduring an intrusive home study and an in-
dividualized inquiry into the child's "best interests," a court eventually,
many months after the child's birth, will approve the application of the
nonbiological parent to adopt.75 The whole process is likely to cost
thousands of dollars.
69. A 1983 opinion by the Attorney General of Oklahoma concluded that artificial
insemination of an unmarried woman is illegal in Oklahoma. See Linda J. Lacey, The
Law of Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Parenthood in Oklahoma: Roadblocks to
the Right to Procreate, 22 TULSA L.J. 281, 284-86 (1987).
70. See Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by
Donor in the United States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979) (reporting on a survey
of physicians, 90 percent of whom said that they would not perform artificial insemina-
tion on an unmarried woman); Caroline H. Sparks & Jean A. Hamilton, Psychological
Issues Related to Alternative Insemination, 22 PROF. PSYCHOL. 308, 311-12 (1991) (re-
porting that lesbians often face especial difficulties obtaining services from clinics).
71. For a discussion of the difficulties the nonbiological partner experiences when
not accepted as a prospective parent during her partner's pregnancy, see Barbara M.
McCandlish, Against All Odds: Lesbian Mother Family Dynamics, in GAY AND LEs-
BIAN PARENTS 23 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1987).
72. Florida and New Hampshire prohibit adoptions by gay men and lesbians. See
FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1994). In a few
other states, appellate courts have declared homosexuals unsuitable to be adoptive par-
ents. See Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Ar-
rangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183,
197 n.53 (1995).
73. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.K.J. and K.A.K., Nos. 95CA0531, 95CA0532,
1996 WL 316800 (Colo. Ct. App. June 13, 1996) (holding that only a person married to
the biological partner is eligible for the rules regarding stepparent adoption).
74. See Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming Barriers to Les-
bian Family Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175, 182-87 (1995).
75. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993) (noting that
the Department of Social Services had conducted a home study and that over a dozen
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Lesbian couples need a simpler and more welcoming process.
They need, at a minimum, the procedures available in most states to le-
gally married couples in comparable circumstances. For such couples,
most states' laws provide a straightforward procedure governing artifi-
cial insemination through clinics or sperm banks.76 The sterile husband
simply acknowledges in writing his concurrence in his wife's insemina-
tion and his acceptance of the child as his own. He is then treated for
purposes of the law in exactly the manner that he would be if he had
been the biological father. No home study is required. No court hearing
is held. The child's birth certificate simply records him as the father of
the child. Lesbian couples need access to the same automatic registering
of parenthood for the nonbiological female partner. Once the state gets
beyond the idea that lesbians are doubtful as parent-figures (or less than
full citizens), an individualized inquiry into the "best interests of the
child" is no more appropriate for them than it is for opposite-sex mar-
ried couples.
One aspect of current law relating to artificial insemination would
continue to pose problems for lesbian couples even if they were permit-
ted to marry and given access to the comfortable rules described above
for fertilization through a sperm bank. Some lesbian couples prefer to
use a donor who is known to them and to perform the insemination pri-
vately without the sperm bank as intermediary.7 When opposite-sex
married couples in which the husband is sterile rely upon a donor
known to them, they do not qualify for the automatic birth registration
system that applies when they make use of a regulated sperm bank, and
the legal position of the husband and the donor may be open to doubt.
78
witnesses testified in support of adoption); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y.
1995); Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.S., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993).
76. See Lori B. Andrews, Alternative Reproduction and the Law of Adoption, in
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACnCE, supra note 61, § 14.02 (noting that thirty states have
adopted statutory rules that a properly consenting husband becomes the legal father for
all purposes, and that courts in most other states have reached the same result by rely-
ing on the common law presumption of legitimacy for children born within marriage
and on the agreement of the parties prior to conception.).
77. See ELIZABETH NOBLE, HAVING YoUR BABY BY DONOR INSEMINATION:
A COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE 160-96 (1987).
78. In many states, the common law rule that forbids a husband from challenging
the legitimacy of a child conceived during a marriage would, if carried over in its appli-
cation to same-sex marriages, protect the legal status of the nonbiological parent. In
some states, however, a failure to comply with the requirements of the artificial insemi-
nation statute have led courts not to impose child support obligations upon divorce on
the husband. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K. & Victoria T., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986); In re Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (deciding a
case in which the husband expressly disapproved of the wife's seeking artificial insemi-
nation); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
November 1996]
HeinOnline  -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 467 1996-1997
Michigan Law Review
Exactly what scheme of regulation is wisest in the case of donors
outside the anonymous donor system is vexing, for whenever the donor
knows the parents, the possibility exists that he will want to assert a
right to a visiting or other relationship with the child, and there is much
debate over the desirability of giving courts authority to order such rela-
tionships over the objections of the principal caregivers. 79 The important
point here is that these issues remain vexing whether or not the parent-
ing couple is same-sex or opposite-sex and whether the couple is mar-
ried or not and that, whatever their resolution, lesbian couples and
opposite-sex couples should be treated in the same way, for the children
being born to these couples need the same sorts of opportunities and
protections.
Similarly problematic are the situations for gay male partners when
they wish one of them to serve as the biological father for a child they
plan to raise together.8 0 This situation is troublesome for it necessarily
involves a much more substantial involvement by the other biological
parent - the surrogate mother - than in the case of artificial insemi-
nation through a surrogate father, involvement under circumstances in
which there are well-founded concerns for the interests of the mother
and of women in general.81
Reflecting differing resolutions of these concerns, state laws vary
widely today regarding the legality and enforceability of surrogacy ar-
rangements. Some prohibit surrogacy agreements altogether; some re-
fuse to enforce them but do not prohibit the arrangements if voluntarily
carried out; and some permit enforcement if the parties comply with va-
rious state-imposed requirements and if the mother does not change her
mind within a statutorily prescribed period.82 Among the requirements
in many states is that only married couples may enter into surrogacy ar-
rangements with a donor mother.83 Thus, under these varying schemes,
few gay men could legally enter into an enforceable surrogacy agree-
79. See Brad Sears, Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves: The (Dys)functional
Approach in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 559 (1994).
80. See Hollandsworth, supra note 72.
81. See generally MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL
AND HUMAN ISSUES (2d ed. 1990); SCOTT B. RAE, Tim ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: BRAVE NEW FAMILIES? (1994); SURROGATE MOTH-
ERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY (Larry Gostin ed., 1990); Randy Frances Kandel,
Which Came First: The Mother or the Egg?, A Kinship Solution to Gestational Surro-
gacy, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 165 (1994).
82. See Hollandsworth, supra note 72, at 201-07 (providing a helpful review of
state statutes).
83. Many states have adopted some version of the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, which restricts surrogacy agreements to married couples. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 (1996). Arkansas is apparently the only state that ex-
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ment, and, when they are able to do so, they would still have to over-
come the adoption problems that lesbian couples face when both part-
ners seek to be recognized as the legal parents of the child born to one
of them. A few gay male couples have successfully negotiated the diffi-
culties, with both partners ending up accepted by the state as the child's
legal parents,84 but couples in other states would presumably founder on
formal and informal policies barring adoptions by unmarried couples
and homosexual persons. The issues surrounding surrogacy are com-
plex, but, whatever their resolution, gay male couples need access to
whatever scheme is made available to opposite-sex married couples.
3. When Neither Partner is the Biological Parent: Adoption and
Foster Care
Gay men and lesbians also wish to adopt or serve as foster parents
for children who are not the biological child of either partner. Today, a
few states prohibit lesbians and gay men from adopting under any cir-
cumstances and a few others prohibit them from serving as foster par-
ents.85 Most other states make adoption or foster care very difficult in
practice for persons who are openly gay or lesbian. 6 Gay people are not
alone in encountering difficulties in adoption. Single heterosexual indi-
viduals are also disfavored in practice almost everywhere.87 When sin-
gle persons, gay or heterosexual, are permitted to adopt, they are often
offered only the most hard-to-place children, children who are older and
have had multiple foster placements, or children with multiple
handicaps.88
By contrast, while procedures for adoption and foster care vary
widely across the country, it is the case everywhere that, whatever the
procedure, the married heterosexual couple stands highest in the hierar-
chy of preferred units for placement of a child.89 The status that is ac-
plicitly permits an unmarried man to enter into a surrogacy arrangement. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1996); Hollandsworth, supra note 72, at 205.
84. See Hollandsworth, supra note 72, at 200.
85. See supra note 72 for state laws relating to adoption. New Hampshire by stat-
ute prohibits gay men and lesbians from serving as foster parents. See Joseph Evall,
Sexual Orientation and Adoptive Matching, 25 FAM. L.Q. 347, 352-54 (1991); Develop-
ments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508, 1643
(1989).
86. See Wendell Ricketts & Roberta Achtenberg, The Adoptive and Foster Gay
and Lesbian Parent, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTs 89-111 (Frederick Bozett ed.,
1987).
87. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDs: ADOPTION AND THE POLIT-
ICS OF PARENTING 70-72 (1993).
88. See id.; see also Hollandsworth, supra note 72, at 197 n.54.
89. BARTHOLET, supra note 87, at 70.
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corded to married opposite-sex couples today would provide fully ade-
quate legal protection for the interests of gay male and lesbian couples
and for the children they would raise. The increased opportunity to
adopt that same-sex couples would enjoy if allowed to marry would
arise less from particular formal rules than from the effects on judges
and agencies of the legislature's blessing, for in many places it is not le-
gal prohibitions that hold judges back from placing children with gay
individuals or couples, but rather a belief that gay people are not so-
cially acceptable caretakers of children.
The troubling question for those disposed toward legal same-sex
marriage is not whether the adoption opportunities available to married
couples today would help lesbian and gay couples enough. It is whether
they would help them too much. Some might claim that no rational ba-
sis exists for preferring married couples over single persons or over un-
married couples. 90 I believe that both preferences are at least rational,
even if not fully sensible.9' But, even if the justification is tenuous, gay
couples should not resist marriage simply because others remain dis-
criminated against in this context. The answer lies in working to change
over time the inappropriate limitations on others' access to adoption.
Permitting gay and lesbian couples to adopt is likely to advance rather
than hinder movements for single-parent adoption, because successful
adoptions by lesbian and gay couples are likely to help corrode the
myth that it takes two persons of opposite sexes as parent figures to
raise a child adequately.
C. Laws Regulating the Economic Relationship of Couples or
Between the Couple and the State
A considerable majority of the laws that provide for differing treat-
ment for married persons deal with the married couple as an economic
unit. They build on beliefs or guesses about the economic relationships
90. As to the discrimination in adoption against single persons, see Jennifer Jaff,
Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried People in American Law, 30 ARIZ. L.
Ruv. 207, 216-17 (1988).
91. The justification for preferring couples over single persons runs as follows:
first, that children will be better off in general when able to rely on two caretakers and
two sources of support and, second, that even if there is no evidence that children
adopted by single parents fare less well than children adopted by couples, a preference
for couples, in places with limited numbers of available children, creates the likelihood
that each adopted child brings pleasure to two adults. As to the preference for married
couples over other pairs of persons who come forward to adopt, there may be no ra-
tional reason to prefer married couples to couples "Who have entered some other formal
relationship like a domestic partnership, but the state does have a basis for preferring as
adoptive parents couples who have indicated a commitment to remain together.
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that married persons actually have and on prescriptive views about what
those relationships ought to be. They assume that married persons differ
from most single persons, including most single persons who share a
residence with another person, in one or more of the following ways:
the married partners will live more cheaply together than they would if
they lived apart (that is, that there are routine economies of scale); the
two will pool most or all of their current financial resources; the two
will make decisions about the expenditure of these resources in a man-
ner not solely determined by which party's labors produced the re-
source; the two will often engage in divisions of labor for their mutual
benefit; and one partner, typically the woman, will often become eco-
nomically dependent on the other.
To the extent that these laws have an empirical foundation, it is un-
clear whether the images of opposite-sex relationships that lie behind
them will fit the circumstances of the sorts of gay male and lesbian
couples who would marry under a change in the law. No adequate re-
search exists about the current behavior or expectations of lesbian and
gay couples regarding the economic dimensions of their relationships,
and we cannot know, of course, what sorts of couples would choose to
marry in the future.92 What evidence there is suggests that most lesbian
and gay couples in long-term relationships believe in pooling resources
and practice it today,93 and that pooling is particularly common among
those who engage in ceremonies of commitment.94 The evidence leaves
open the strong possibility, however, that long-term same-sex couples
generally keep more of their resources separate than married opposite-
sex couples do - that more are cost "splitters" rather than
92. Not surprisingly, none of the studies of gay and lesbian couples, including the
few that examine the manner in which they handle finances, differentiates between
those couples who would legally marry if they could and those who, like many hetero-
sexual couples, would choose to remain single even if marriage were legally available.
93. The best available information about the economic behavior of gay and lesbian
couples comes from Blumstein and Schwartz's pioneer study from the early 1980s of
the handling of money by American couples. See BLuMSTEIN & ScHWARTZ, supra
note 51, at 94-111. This study included substantial but nonrandom samples of married
and unmarried opposite-sex couples and of gay male and lesbian couples. The authors
found that the great majority of married opposite-sex couples expected and favored the
pooling of income and resources. Gay men and lesbians in couples had more diverse at-
titudes, with a significant minority of both women and men opposing pooling. Still, for
those in relationships that had lasted more than two years, the proportion who favored
pooling substantially exceeded the proportion who opposed it. Blumstein's samples of
same-sex couples did not differentiate between those who would and would not have
married if legal marriage had been available.
94. See LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 5, at 115, 127, 145, 153, 163,
208 (recorded interviews).
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"poolers." 95 It is also probable that, if permitted to marry, fewer per-
sons in same-sex marriages would become economically dependent on
their spouses than occurs among women in opposite-sex marriages
today.
Rather than attempt to generalize in the abstract about the similari-
ties and differences of opposite- and same-sex couples in the handling
of the financial aspects of their relationships, I will consider the proba-
ble fit of various laws with the conditions of gay and lesbian couples as
each sort of regulation is considered. The review that follows divides
the many financial regulations that treat married persons differently than
single persons into three rough sorts - those that fix the relationship
between married persons and the state, those that fix the economic rela-
tionship between the two married persons themselves, and those that fix
the relationship between the two married persons and private third per-
sons - because these sorts of regulations typically serve quite different
ends. Even with this crude division, the widely varying laws of the fifty
states hamper any attempt to characterize the legal incidents of mar-
riage, for these laws are neither identical to one another nor internally
consistent within states. Still, there is a certain coherence to it all.
1. The Regulation of the Financial Relationship Between Married
Persons and the State
Tax laws and laws pertaining to government benefits commonly
treat married persons in a distinctive manner by regarding them for
most purposes as a single economic unit. These laws have a rough logic
to support them but sometimes produce unintended behavioral effects.
Consider some central examples. Federal and state income tax laws
create a system of joint returns for married couples that treats the
couple as a single economic entity.96 Under these provisions, when only
one spouse earns any income, the total tax liability for the couple will
be less than it would be if the income-earning spouse filed as a single
person, a result that may be thought justified because two people are
living on the single earner's income. On the other hand, when both
spouses work and each earns even a fairly moderate income, their total
95. Jane Bryant Quinn observes that not all married heterosexual couples pool
their resources. She cleverly observes two patterns for handling income and expenses
even within married couples: "splitters" who keep their own separate accounts, and
"poolers" who put everything into a common pot. Over time, she says, if the marriage
goes well, "splitters usually turn into spoolers, splitting some, pooling some, and grow-
ing less antsy about who pays for what." JANE BRYANT QUINN, MAKING THE MOST
OF YOUR MoNi'Y 81 (1991). She does not rely on statistics.
96. See I.R.C. § l(a) (1994).
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tax liability will often be higher than it would have been if each had
filed as a single person, a result that may again be thought justified be-
cause, by pooling incomes, they can live together more inexpensively
than two single persons living separately.97 In many situations, these
two sets of rules produce wholly justifiable outcomes, but their para-
doxical impact in practice is that many working men and women maxi-
mize their incomes by living together but not marrying, each filing a
separate return, even though they might otherwise prefer to marry.98 The
same rules also discourage some married women from seeking employ-
ment outside the home, because they conclude that the marginal tax rate
on any earnings they produced would be so high as to make their eco-
nomic contribution trivial.99
Similar rough justifications and undesired effects characterize the
rules that apply when low-income married persons who are aged, blind,
or disabled apply for federal welfare benefits under the program of Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI). If a married couple apply together,
their grant will be lower than it would be if they were treated as two in-
dividuals applying separately.' °° Similarly, if only one member of the
couple applies, the income of the applicant's spouse will be assumed to
be available to the applicant and will be taken into account in determin-
ing both the applicant's eligibility for the benefit and the size of the
grant. 01 Much the same rules of income attribution apply when a mar-
ried person seeks a government-backed educational loan.102 For couples
who in fact pool their income and resources, these government benefit
97. For example, two single individuals living together who each earn $30,000
would pay $1248 less in total federal income taxes than two married individuals who
earn the same amounts and filed a joint return. See Jonathan B. Forman, What Can Be
Done About Marriage Penalties?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 1, 5 (1996). Similar differences apply
to low-income earners who qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit. See Anne L.
Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Re-
form, 108 HARv. L. REv. 533, 559-64 (1995).
98. A fine recent critique can be found in Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the
Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983
(1993) [hereinafter McCaffery, Taxation and the Family]. See also Edward J. McCaf-
fery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and So-
cial Change, 103 YALE LJ. 595, 617-19 (1993) [hereinafter McCaffery, Slouching To-
wards Equality].
99. See sources cited supra note 98.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1994).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(1) (1994). An unusual section in the statute establishing
the program of Supplemental Security Income provides that if a man and woman "hold
themselves out as married," they will be treated for purposes of the SSI program as if
they were married. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2) (1994). Federal laws recognize the unmar-
ried couple only when those laws work to the couple's financial disadvantage.
102. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087pp, 1087nn(b)(1)(A) (1994).
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rules make sense, but they can impose hardships when the rules attri-
bute more income as available than the spouse can comfortably contrib-
ute'03 and can sometimes deter couples from marrying who otherwise
would.
Government taxing and benefit regulations of other sorts also build
on the expectation that married couples will share resources and recog-
nize that one spouse is often economically dependent on the other.
Some of these programs, fortunately, avoid the undesired behavioral in-
centives we have just discussed. When a long-employed worker retires
with a spouse who has been a homemaker and has not worked in the la-
bor force long enough to be entitled to full Social Security benefits in
her own right, the nonworking spouse, if over sixty-two, is entitled to
benefits through the worker. 04 Similarly, when a long-employed worker
dies, Social Security benefits will typically be available for a surviving
spouse over sixty who is not entitled to full benefits through her own
contributions as an employee. 10 5
Gift and estate taxes also reflect a view of the married couple as a
single economic unit in which dependencies arise. When a well-heeled
spouse transfers property to the other spouse during the marriage, the
transfer is not subject to the federal gift "tax that would apply to gifts to
others, including the donor's children. 106 When appreciated assets held
in the name of one spouse are transferred at divorce to the other spouse,
no capital gains tax or gift tax is due at the time of the transfer.0 7 And,
when a spouse dies, bequests to the other spouse are not taxed under
federal estate tax laws. 0 Public and private employers further recog-
nize the economic interdependency of spouses by making health care
benefits available to their employees' spouses, and, just as federal and
state income tax laws exempt from taxation the value of a worker's
own employer-provided health care benefits, so too these same laws ex-
empt from taxation the value of the benefits for the worker's spouse.'09
103. See Paul Drizner, Comment, Medicaid's Unhealthy Side Effect: The Financial
Burdens on At-Home Spouses ofInstitutionalized Recipients, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1031,
1036-47 (1987).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)-(c). See U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SO-
CIAL SECuRnTy HANDBOOK, § 305 (12th ed. 1995). In much the same manner, a di-
vorced spouse not fully covered through her own employment will be covered through
her former spouse on reaching the requisite age. See id.
105. See id. § 401.
106. See I.R.C. §§ 1041, 2523 (1996); see also Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex
Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 L. & SEXUALrrY 97, 123-29 (1991).
107. I.R.C. § 1041(a)-(c) (1996).
108. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1996).
109. I.R.C. §§ 105, 213 (1996).
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Gay and lesbian couples are subject to none of these rules, neither
the benefits nor the burdens." 0 No joint return. No attributed income.
No exemption from gift or estate taxes. Even when employers provide
health benefits to both married employees and to employees with a
same-sex domestic partner, only the married employees obtain the bene-
fit of the tax exemption for the value of their partners' health coverage;
the employee with a same-sex partner must report the value of the ben-
efit to his partner as income and pay taxes on it.
Would gay and lesbian couples be advantaged by being treated like
heterosexual married couples across this range of state and federal legal
consequences? They would be subject to the same unfortunate behav-
ioral incentives that these rules create today for opposite-sex couples."'
A gay man with HIV on Medicaid, for example, might choose not to
marry on learning that, if he did, he would cease to be eligible for bene-
fits even though his partner and he did not actually earn enough to pay
the couple's medical bills. Indeed, it is possible that an even higher pro-
portion of gay male and lesbian couples would be economically disad-
vantaged by the application of the current tax laws than are married
opposite-sex couples. The only couples who consistently benefit from
the current laws are those in which only one partner works in the labor
force, and, taxes aside, both partners prefer this arrangement.' 12 Given
enduring sex-ascribed roles, the employment of only one partner is
likely to be the situation more often in opposite-sex than in same-sex
couples. Moreover, the premise of many of the current rules is that mar-
ried couples actually share in the control of resources and expendi-
tures." 3 When that premise fails, it is doubtful whether the burdens of
the joint return should be imposed. Some observers have raised doubts
about the actual degree of sharing of control in most heterosexual mar-
ried couples,' 4 and it is quite possible that an even higher proportion of
gay men and lesbians who would marry would be persons who in their
day-to-day lives would share only some of their income.
On the other hand, remember that not all tax and welfare rules
work to the harm of gay couples who would marry. In some couples,
only one partner would work in the labor force, and for them the bene-
fits of health coverage and the joint tax return might be substantial. In
others, both partners Would work, but only one with a job with medical
110. See Cain, supra note 106.
111. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
113. See Marjorie E. Komhauser, Love, Money and the IRS: Family, Income-
Sharing, and the Joint Income-Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 63, 73-80 (1993).
114. See id.
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benefits. For them, the value of tax-exempt benefits through the partner
with coverage could be considerable. And for those at the highest end
of the income scale, the benefits of the estate and gift tax exemptions
might more than offset the disadvantages of a joint return.
Moreover, in actual practice, even for the couple in which both
partners work and both earn significant incomes, the income tax and
other rules may in actual practice less frequently cause behaviors exper-
ienced as painful by the parties. When neither partner in a couple con-
siders himself or herself the "secondary" worker - when both part-
ners, that is, have strong ties to the labor force - then, while the
perversities of the tax laws may affect some decisions to marry, they
are less likely to lead either partner to drop out of the labor force or feel
economically useless in a manner that he or she resents or later comes
to regret. And, viewed from another perspective, the opportunity for le-
gal marriage, at the very least, provides a choice to opposite-sex
couples whether to marry or not, a choice from which lesbian and gay
couples could benefit for the same sorts of reasons.
2. The Regulation of the Financial Relationship Between Married
Partners
In the United States today, states employ either of two broad
schemes of regulation to define the economic relationship between mar-
ried partners. Nine states (mostly in the West and Southwest) employ
"community property" regimes," 5 under which, to oversimplify, the
spouses own separately whatever they bring into the marriage or receive
by gift or bequest during the marriage and own jointly any other assets
either of them acquires during the marriage, including all assets ac-
quired from their labors." 6 The earnings of each partner are owned
jointly by the pair.117 In the remaining states, called "common law
states," again to oversimplify, the spouses own separately whatever
they acquire in their separate names and jointly whatever they buy in
both names or whatever one by deliberate act puts into joint control." 8
Their earnings are their own. These differences in law sound significant
115. See Elrod & Walker, supra note 49, at 695 (table). The states are Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
116. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., Tr LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.14, at
232-33 (2d ed. 1993); W.S. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES §§ 1:6, 1:8 (1982).
117. Though "owned" jointly, "control" over the earnings may lie initially with
the earner. For example, a paycheck made out to an employee need not be endorsed by
the spouse before being cashed.
118. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 116, § 5.15; MCCLANAHAN, supra
note 116, § 1:07 (comparing common law and community property states).
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and may affect many married persons' perception of the nature of their
relationship,'1 9 but it is probable that personal characteristics and social
conventions linked to gender have greater impact than formal legal
rules on the way that assets are controlled by married persons who live
together.1
20
The rules of property do, however, become crucial at the point of
divorce, for all states impose rules of distribution that have significant
impact on the separate spouses' financial well-being. State divorce laws
differ widely in their structures and in their details, but commonly pro-
duce similar outcomes.
In community property states, each divorcing spouse is entitled to
one-half of the property acquired during the marriage. In some states
judges may deviate from this division in extraordinary circumstances.'
2'
The remaining states have adopted more flexible schemes of property
division generally called "equitable distribution." In these states, courts
are permitted to ignore the rules of separate ownership and divide all
property acquired during the marriage in an equitable manner. Most
statutes list factors for judges to take into account,'2 including, for ex-
ample, each spouse's contribution to the acquisition of an asset and the
economic position of each spouse at the point of separation. Some
states also permit judges to take "fault" into account, and to reach into
assets acquired before the marriage or received by gift or inheritance.'2
In practice in many equitable distribution states, lawyers for divorcing
persons begin negotiations with an assumption of a division closely
similar to the division imposed in community property states: in the ab-
sence of special circumstances, the couple will divide equally all assets
acquired by either during the marriage. 24 And in practice in many com-
munity property and equitable distribution states, the actual division of
119. Lawrence Waggoner believes that the two sets of rules serve to "reinforce the
profoundly different symbolical and psychological feelings within the ongoing mar-
riage." See Waggoner, supra note 29, at 27.
120. See generally BLuMSTEIN & ScHwARTz, supra note 51 (describing the per-
sonal and social characteristics motivating heterosexual relationships and comparing
them to those motivating homosexual and lesbian relationships).
121. See Ekod & Walker, supra note 49, at 723-25.
122. See id. 716-21; UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIvORCE AcT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 238
(1987).
123. See Elrod & Walker, supra note 49, at 725-28.
124. See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disabil-
ity Pay, Workers' Compensation and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance or Replace-
ment Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1986); Elizabeth A. Cheadle, The Devel-
opment of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L.
REv. 1269 (1981). Some common law states have translated this beginning point into a
formal statutory presumption. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A) (Ander-
son Supp. 1995).
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property negotiated by parties often deviates from a fifty-fifty distribu-
tion in ways that have little to do with formal legal rules.
1' 5
What is critical for our purposes is that at the point of divorce,
under either regime, married persons encounter formal systems of
forced allocation of assets that treat married persons as economic part-
ners while they were together. Thus, as a single important example, for
many long-married couples today the largest single asset owned by ei-
ther is a pension account accumulated in the name of one of them. In
both community property and common law states, that part of the pen-
sion assets attributable to the period of the marriage will be subject to
division between the partners.
126
State law also responds at divorce to imbalances in earning capac-
ity between spouses, imbalances that have often been magnified during
the "partnership." It does so in common law states by allowing judges
to consider the disparate financial positions of the parties in the distri-
bution of property.27 Many states have also devised doctrines that per-
mit courts to compensate a spouse in some manner for helping to in-
crease the human capital of the other partner, most commonly by
bearing the costs of putting the partner through professional school. 28
In addition, both community property states and common law states
permit courts to award periodic payments, called alimony or mainte-
nance, for the support of a spouse unable adequately to provide for her-
self or himself after separation. 129 Today alimony is awarded less fre-
quently and for shorter durations than in the past. 30 It nonetheless
remains common after long-term marriages in which one party has high
125. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New
York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. Rnv. 621
(1991).
126. See IRA ELLMAN ET AL., FAmILY LAW 253-57 (1991).
127. See UNiF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 307(a), 9A U.L.A. 239 (1987),
adopted in many states.
128. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family
Law, 29 FAM. L.Q. 741, 774 tbl. 5 (1996). A few states treat the professional degree
earned during the marriage as property subject to equitable division. See, e.g., O'Brien
v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). In some others, compensatory payments much
like alimony may be ordered by the court. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d
527 (NJ. 1982). In California, a community property state, special legislation permits a
court to order a divorcing spouse to reimburse the other spouse for the costs of tuition
and education. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641 (West 1994).
129. See Elrod & Spector, supra note 128, at 770 tbl. 1; 2 CLARK, supra note 18,
220-334.
130. See LEONORE WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: Tm UNEx-
PECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 33 (1985).
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earnings and the other party, almost always the wife, has been a long-
term homemaker.
131
Death is another occasion when the law imposes financial obliga-
tions because of marriage. Under the laws of nearly all states, a married
person cannot unilaterally prevent his spouse from inheriting part of his
assets. Thus, when a married person dies with a will and the will fails
to provide for the surviving spouse, the laws of nearly all common law
states permit the surviving spouse to claim a "forced" or "elective"
share of the estate, commonly one-third or one-half. 132 Much the same
result is reached in long-term marriages in community property states
because, no matter what one spouse considers to be her separate prop-
erty and attempts to bequeath by will to others, one-half of the assets
acquired by the couple during the marriage will be considered the prop-
erty of the other spouse at death.
133
Thus at both divorce and death, states impose on married couples a
prescriptive view of the appropriate financial relationship between
them. Most states now permit couples, at the point of marriage or dur-
ing the marriage, to contract for a different arrangement on death or di-
vorce than the law would otherwise impose, though also placing some
limits to ensure that the decision to contract was "voluntary" and
"informed."1 34
131. See Ann L. Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family
Care, 71 N.C. L. Rv. 721, 745-46 (1993). For heterosexual married couples today in
which the wife has not been in the labor force, the alimony and property division rules
facilitate at least modestly the division of labor within couples - one developing mate-
rial wealth, one providing care for the family or pursuing nonwealthgaining activities.
See Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); but see Jana B.
Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Jus-
tification for Alimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2423 (1994).
132. See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 83, 99-104 (1994); Lawrence Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-
Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP., PROBATE &
TR. J. 683, 720 (1994); see also Urtw. PROB. CODE § 2-102, 8 U.L.A. 59 (1982) (di-
viding the marital assets on a 50-50 basis).
133. See Brashier, supra note 132, at 97. The elective share rule can produce
anomalous results in common law states in some cases in which a person dies shortly
after marriage to a person who already has substantial assets of his or her own.
134. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 126, at 662-87; Marjorie M. Shultz, Con-
tractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204,
280-88 (1982). Eighteen states have adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.
See Note, 7ll Divorce Do Us Part: The Validity of Antenuptial Agreements in Michigan,
38 WAYNE L. REv. 1919, 1921 n.3 (1992). Such agreements are apparently fairly com-
mon among wealthy persons who have children and who remarry late in life and who
want to preserve for their children the assets they have acquired up to that point in their
lives.
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How, by comparison, does the law treat the income and assets of
single persons with a long-term partner? Very differently indeed. In
both community property and common law states, the earnings of an
unmarried person and the resources bought with those earnings are en-
tirely the property of the earner. Moreover, in no state today, does the
state impose on the estate of an unmarried person a forced share for a
surviving partner. 35 An unmarried person can leave her money to
whomever she pleases, no matter how long a relationship she may have
had with a partner.
The rules relating to the breakup of unmarried couples vary widely
among the states. Until the last thirty years or so, courts in nearly all
states refused to intervene at all, even when the parties had agreed to
share assets, on the ground that the cohabiting relationship itself was
immoral.136 A few states still retain this approach. 37 In most states,
however, the law has changed, responding to the huge growth in the
numbers of unmarried opposite-sex couples living together and to the
changed social perception of the acceptability of such cohabitation.1
3
1
Courts will enforce express agreements between unmarried persons to
support each other or to divide property titled in the other's name.
39
Some of the cases have involved same-sex couples.140
A few states have gone further than the enforcement of agree-
ments, coming closer to imposing a marital regime. Some will enforce
"implied contracts," the contents of which courts infer not from words
of agreement between the partners but from the partners' conduct -
and which may in fact not reflect any actual agreement between the
parties.' 4' In a few more states, judges will, at the request of a separat-
ing long-term unmarried partner, simply impose a property division that
seems "just," even in the absence of any express or implied agreement
135. Waggoner, supra note 29, at 62-63.
136. See, e.g., Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 fI. 229, 249 (1882).
137. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
138. On the demographic changes, see Arlen Thornton, Cohabitation and Mar-
riage in the 1980s, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 497 (1988); Waggoner, supra note 29, at 63.
139. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that courts should
enforce contracts between unmarried partners); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154
(N.Y. 1980); see also Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the
Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEo. L.. 1829 (1987).
140. Only a few states have appellate decisions on the question whether such con-
tracts will be honored for same-sex couples. See, e.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1981).
141. In the Marvin case, the California Supreme Court invited enforcing implied
contracts and other traditional equitable remedies. See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122-23. In
Morone, the New York Court of Appeals held that its courts would enforce express but
not implied contracts. See Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1156.
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between the parties. 42 In most states, however, unmarried partners still
have no state-prescribed obligations to each other that apply in the ab-
sence of agreement. Each can walk away taking whatever is titled in his
or her name.
At first blush, the rules currently applied in most states to the un-
married may seem to most gay men and lesbians preferable to the rules
of forced sharing imposed on married people. Most states, as just de-
scribed, impose on unmarried couples only what the couple itself has
agreed to. Such a regime may well appeal to couples who are suspi-
cious of the state and couples in which neither partner is economically
dependent on the other. Many individuals in couples in which both part-
ners are working would reject the notion that all their resources are
joint or that they have continuing responsibilities for the welfare of the
other if they break up. 43 Many would, for example, probably consider
their pensions to be separate property, even though acquired during the
relationship. Many would find notions of alimony offensive. And, even
if they saw themselves as having some continuing responsibilities,
many would reject the notion of the state, through its judges, having the
power to apportion fault or responsibility between them under the dis-
cretionary guidelines found in common law states.
All this is true, yet I think that the rules regarding the financial as-
pects of divorce now in place for married couples would serve lesbian
and gay male couples reasonably well. In the first place, the property
rules of divorce are given life as part of a larger set of procedures gov-
erning divorce proceedings, procedures that encourage, or force,
couples to wind up their financial relationship prior to moving on to an-
other relationship. Many people would acknowledge (at least ex ante)
the value of having some sort of regularized process for dividing prop-
erty, without regard to the particular rules. In the second place, the rules
regarding the division of property for married people are, to an increas-
ing extent, subject to alteration by the agreement of the parties. Before
or during marriage, the parties may contract for different outcomes be-
tween them that will be honored by courts if voluntarily entered. 44 So
142. See Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764 (Ore. Ct. App. 1991); Worden v.
Worden, 676 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). Even in these cases, the courts have re-
fused to adopt as a general rule a principle of equal division such as they impose on di-
vorcing couples.
143. See BLUMSTEIN & SchwARTZ, supra note 51.
144. See Grace G. Blumberg, New Models of Marriage and Divorce, in CONTEM-
PORARY MARRIAGE: CoMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON A CHANGING INSTrrUTION
349, 354 (Kingsley Davis ed., 1985).
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seen, the rules of marriage operate as a default regime for couples who
marry and do not choose a different scheme for themselves.
Of course, just as only a small proportion of opposite-sex married
couples enter agreements today to vary from the rules otherwise im-
posed at divorce, so it is probable that few gay male and lesbian
couples would do so in the future. My own belief, however, is that a
default rule of imposed sharing is preferable for gay male and lesbian
couples to the default rule of separate property and no continuing obli-
gations that now exists for unmarried couples. As a starting point, a
great many - though by no means all - gay men and lesbians who
would choose to marry would engage voluntarily in the substantial
pooling of resources. 145 They would probably feel comfortable with the
notion that assets that they acquired and used during the relationship -
furniture or appliances, for example - belonged to them jointly even
though one of them paid the bill on her separate account. Conversely,
those gay and lesbian individuals who would wish to marry but care a
great deal about financial independence - those who, for example,
would wish to be certain to keep their pensions separate or avoid the
payment of alimony - would probably be of higher than average eco-
nomic status and in a better position to know about and to take the initi-
ative to contract out of the default rules than are those who value
sharing.
146
And, finally, as between the two sets of default rules, the moral
claims for independence and separate ownership have their own weak-
nesses. Some may look at the world of forced sharing and alimony, re-
member a time when married women could own nothing in their own
name, and wish to reject any reminders of the dependence of women on
their husbands. 47 But the world of independence has its own poisoned
roots. Independence in law means that the person with legal title wins,
and title, standing alone, bears little necessary relation to the efforts that
lie behind the generation of the asset or to the moral implications of a
long-shared life.
145. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
146. In American Couples, Blumstein and Schwartz do not indicate the correlation
between willingness to pool and income level, but they do report that, among gay men,
when one partner has much more income than the other, he typically asserts considera-
ble control over the expenditure of income and shares decisionmaking less. See
BLUMSTEIN & SCHwARTZ, supra note 51, at 105, 59-60. These high-earning men
seem in the best position to protect themselves by insisting on agreements about keep-
ing assets separate.
147. Cf Herma Hill Kaye, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault
Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CN. L. REv. 1 (1987).
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Taken together, these considerations even support the claim that
the default property rules for marriage will not merely serve most gay
and lesbian couples reasonably well but will, in general, serve gay and
lesbian couples who choose to marry better than they serve opposite-sex
married couples today. As others have pointed out, the rules of sharing
for married couples today still typically leave most women in depleted
financial circumstances after divorce and cause particular harm to those
who have cared for children.14 The equitable distribution and comnimu-
nity property rules do force a sharing of assets acquired during mar-
riage, but women often do not receive even half of the available as-
sets. 149 Moreover, men commonly leave marriages with enhanced
earning capacity, while women, who already earn much less, often find
their capacity to generate income impaired.150 Alimony, when ordered at
all to redress the imbalance, is typically too small to bring women any-
where near their prior standard of living.' 5' It also proves difficult to
enforce.
Gay men and lesbians compelled on separation to share assets will
be hurt less frequently when the law's promise of sharing fails to pro-
duce economic parity between the partners. Because the members of
such couples are always of the same sex they more often earn similar
incomes and are less likely to have gender-assigned expectations of di-
vided responsibilities for income production during the relationship.
Despite my claims that gay men and lesbians will in general be
served decently by the financial rules of marriage, some reasons for
pause still exist. In the common law states especially, the process of
resolving disputes over financial matters brings married couples under
the authority of judges with broad discretion. How judges, most of them
heterosexual, will respond to gay and lesbian couples who come before
them is hard to predict. Even if they try to comprehend and apply the
norms accepted by the same-sex couple, they may be unable to do so.
How will they respond when a gay man has been financially dependent
on an older partner by tacit agreement of the partners? Here lingering
distaste for homosexual persons may mix with a general bias against
148. MARTHA A. FrtaMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALrrY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 4 (1992); June Carbone, Equality and Differ-
ence: Reclaiming Motherhood as a Central Focus of Family Law, 17 L. & Soc. IN-
QuiRY 471 (1992).
149. See Garrison, supra note 125, at 671.
150. See FiNEMAN, supra note 148, at 36-37; see also DAviD CHAMBERS, MAK-
ING FATHERS PAY 37-68 (1979).
151. For a review of views about the functions of alimony and the social position
of women, see June Carbone & Margaret Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideol-
ogy, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REv. 953, 987-1004 (1991).
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the financially dependent male. 52 How will judges respond to a same-
sex couple in which one but not both have had frequent sexual partners
outside the couple? 53 I have no easy answer to these worries. The prob-
lem, however, for any couple concerned about judicial discretion can be
ameliorated or avoided by contractual agreement about obligations or
by agreement to mediate or arbitrate using a third party whose sensibili-
ties they trust. But many couples will surely fail to enter into such
agreements and one or both of them ultimately will feel abused by the
judicial system.
3. The Regulation of the Relationship Between the Married Couple
and Third Persons
Just as states create rules defining the state's relationship with mar-
ried persons and of married persons' relationships with each other, so
also, in a narrower range of circumstances, states prescribe rules for the
relationship between married persons and private third parties. Most
such private relationships are left to private ordering: a married person
can negotiate to borrow money on her own or to borrow with her
spouse (or with anyone else for that matter); employers and employees
negotiate over whether or not spouses will be included in various bene-
fits. But a few protections and obligations are not left solely to the pri-
vate sphere, and the rules that do exist again build upon notions of the
married couple as a mutually interdependent economic unit.
A handful of states, for example, now require employers over a
certain size to provide access to health insurance to the otherwise unin-
sured spouses of employees. 54 Similarly, in a quite different context, all
states provide for a spouse to recover in a wrongful death action for ec-
onomic losses when a third party has caused the death of the other
spouse by negligence or an unjustified deliberate act. 55 These protec-
tions for spouses are matched by at least one legal burden: most states
impose on spouses an obligation to pay for "necessaries," such as
152. Cf Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981) (concluding without adequate
foundation that a relationship between two men, one of whom was old and rich and the
other young and economically dependant, rested primarily on sex as the consideration).
153. In many states, judges may consider marital "fault" in dividing property or
awarding alimony. See 2 CLARK, supra note 18, § 16.3, at 194-96 (property); id.
§ 17.5, at 267-69 (alimony); Elrod & Walker, supra note 49, at 534. Judges rarely get
the opportunity to exercise their discretion because, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, parties settle before a hearing, but the prospect that a judge will take fault into
account can affect the bargaining process between partners.
154. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 87-4, 393-7, 393-21 (1993).
155. 2 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND
INJURY § 10.2 (3d ed. 1992).
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emergency medical care, provided by third parties to the other
spouse.156 More broadly, in most community property states, a creditor
can collect out a married couple's community property for a debt con-
tracted by one of the spouses, without regard to the contribution of that
spouse to the community property.
157
None of these protections and burdens applies to unmarried
couples.158 Yet, in differing degrees, they probably justly fit the circum-
stances of most long-term gay and lesbian relationships as we have dis-
cussed them: most long-term partners would probably accept the obliga-
tion to meet each other's most basic needs,'5 9 and many would be
affected both financially and emotionally by the death of their spouse,
and, when they are so affected, deserve compensation from a wrongful
actor.
I. OBSERVATIONS
American states and the federal government, as we now have seen,
treat married individuals differently than single individuals in three
broad respects - privileging their relationship to their spouse in certain
contexts because of their affective ties, providing them and their part-
ners opportunities for legally recognized parenting that are not provided
to others, and extending benefits and imposing obligations based on a
view of the partners as economically intertwined.
Taken together, the rules bearing on marriage offer significant ad-
vantages to those to whom they apply. Looking across the three groups
of regulations we have examined, most of the rules may be seen as
facilitative, in the sense that they enable a couple to live a life that they
define as satisfactory to themselves: the immigration law permits them
to live together in the United States, if that is what they wish; the joint
income tax return and the Social Security laws make it easier for one of
them not to work in the labor force, if that is what they wish; the
parenting laws offer them the opportunity to raise a child as legal
156. See 1 CLARK, supra note 18, § 7.3, at 444-48. For a recent example of a hos-
pital recovering from a wife for services provided to a spouse, even after the couple had
separated, see Forsyth Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Chisholm, 22 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1185
(N.C. Feb. 2, 1996).
157. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 116, § 5.16, at 242-43; McCLANA-
HAN, supra note 116, §§ 4:31 - 4:36.
158. As to wrongful death, see, e.g., SPEISER ET AL., supra note 155, § 10:21.
159. Hundreds of gay male and lesbian couples in San Francisco have registered
their relationships as domestic partners under the city's Domestic Partnership Act. See
SAN FRANCISCO, CA., ADMIN. CODE §§ 62.1 - 62.8 (1991). In order to register,
couples must affirm that they accept responsibility for each others' "basic living ex-
penses." SAN FRANCISCO, CA., ADMIN. CODE § 62.2(a) (1991).
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equals, if that is what they wish. The laws may also be seen as facilita-
tive in a different sense. Some impose particular outcomes, but also per-
mit the married partners to agree on some other arrangement if they so
choose. Indeed, the laws of marriage can be seen today as facilitating
choice in an even broader sense. Since living together outside of mar-
riage is a socially acceptable arrangement today for so many couples -
heterosexual as well as lesbian and gay - the regime of marriage of-
fers a package that can be taken as a whole or rejected in favor of the
alternative state of unmarried coupledom, with its different, less perva-
sive set of rules. The case I have tried to make for gay and lesbian
couples is that they need these opportunities and choices to much the
same degree that heterosexual couples do.
The rules of marriage are not simply facilitative, however. Some
rules relating to financial matters are mandatory. Your income is taken
into account when your spouse applies for welfare. Your spouse, unless
he chooses to relinquish it, becomes entitled upon divorce to share in
the property you acquired in your name during the marriage, and, if you
die, to a share of your estate. You may be forced to pay alimony to sup-
port your spouse. You may be forced to pay for necessities provided to
your spouse by others. I have also sought to show that these obligations
are, on the whole, appropriate for gay and lesbian couples. And even
these mandatory rules can be seen as permissive in the wider sense in
which it was used in the preceding paragraph: they are part of the
whole package of rules that opposite-sex couples can choose to live
within by marrying or live outside of by not marrying. Same-sex
couples need the same choices.
Heterosexual conservatives object to same-sex marriage either on
the ground that sex between persons of the same sex is immoral or
pathological or on the ground that permitting same-sex couples to marry
will somehow contribute to the crumbling of the "traditional" family.
Feminists among gay and lesbian scholars are also often critical of mar-
riage for same-sex couples, fearing different undesirable consequences
for lesbian and queer communities.'6 Neither objecting group focuses
on the fit of specific legal rules with the lives of same-sex couples and,
for this reason, this article has not addressed their claims. Four other
sorts of doubts that do address the legal consequences of marriage
might nonetheless be raised about legal same-sex marriage, even by
some gay men and lesbians who might be expected to be sympathetic. I
end this article by addressing those doubts.
160. See supra notes 11-12.
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One doubt is not about the present, but about the future. It may be
the case that the rules of marriage as they are today fit reasonably well
the circumstances of gay men and lesbians in couples, but marriage-
related rules are hardly static. As in the past, they will change over
time: 161 a lesbian couple who marry in the year 2000 might find them-
selves subject to quite different rules in the year 2020. The future
changes in law that they experience will almost certainly be prompted
by the perceived conditions of women and men in opposite-sex couples
and not by the positions of lesbians and gay men, because lesbian and
gay couples are simply so outnumbered by female-male couples. None-
theless, though many different legal changes are possible over time,
some more attractive than others, 162 marriage as a legal institution is
highly likely to retain useful advantages for same-sex couples. These
advantages will persist so long as adults in this country choose to live
primarily in couple relationships and so long as doing so remains a so-
cially prized condition. Gay people are likely to benefit by having the
opportunity to choose to share in the benefits and responsibilities ac-
corded such relationships. They will simply have to recognize that,
when they do choose to marry, they will be stepping aboard a moving
vessel that others will steer.
A second objection is that there is a better vehicle than something
called "marriage" for extending the appropriate protections and oppor-
tunities to same-sex couples. Especially for those for whom marriage is
indelibly associated with hierarchical male-female relationships, the al-
ternative of permitting same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register
with the state as "domestic partners" and extending to such partners
some or all of the consequences attached to marriage may seem
attractive.
No American state has yet adopted domestic partner registration,
63
but, as we have seen, some states, through imaginative court decisions
and occasional statutes, are beginning to recognize unmarried couples
161. On the flexibility of marriage as an institution through time, see John Modell,
Historical Reflections on American Marriage, in CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE: COM-
PARATIVE PERSPECrIVES ON A CHANGING INSTITUTION 181 (Kingsley Davis ed.,
1985).
162. See the discussion of various commentators in Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitat-
ing Liberalism in Modem Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 687, 708-19; see also June
Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L.
REv. 359 (1994).
163. A substantial number of cities, including New York, San Francisco, Minneap-
olis, and Ann Arbor have adopted registration for unmarried couples by local ordinance.
The California legislature passed a bill to permit state registration of unmarried couples,
but the bill was vetoed by Governor Wilson. CA A.B. 2810, 1993-94 Reg. Sess.
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for particular purposes. 64 Formal registration has been instituted in
Denmark and Norway, where registered same-sex partners are treated
precisely like married couples with regard to all financial and economic
regulations, but are not labelled as "married."' 65 This is not the place to
discuss the whole range of practical and symbolic considerations that
apply to domestic partnership. The point derived from the inquiry in
this article is that whatever the virtues of domestic partnership, nearly
all the legal consequences of marriage have a sound application to the
position of long-term lesbian and gay couples. Unless a regime of do-
mestic partnership were developed under which same-sex couples were
treated just as opposite-sex married couples are, same-sex couples
would probably find that domestic partnership legislation excluded ben-
efits that they would much like to have. Thus, in Denmark, for exam-
ple, registered same-sex couples are treated like opposite-sex married
couples for purposes of economic benefits, but not for purposes of the
adoption laws or any other laws that apply to parenting.
I do not, however, wish to seem critical of the movement for do-
mestic partnership registration. I believe that, though the rose by an-
other name will not smell as sweet to some of us, states are far more
likely to accept domestic partnership than same-sex marriage. Denmark
- and the fifty American states - may eventually accept for gay
couples united under a name other than "marriage" all the special rules
for married persons, including those that apply to parenting. And those
of us who favor legal same-sex marriage must acknowledge that just as
"domestic partnership" legislation might provide only parts of the
package of legal consequences that now attaches to marriage, so also le-
gal "marriage" itself might be granted piecemeal as well: a state might
open legal marriage to same-sex couples but withhold parenting or
other benefits from them, or, more fundamentally, some states might
extend all state laws bearing on marriage to same-sex couples while the
federal government withheld the incidents of federal law.166
A third doubt about pursuing changes in the laws of who may
marry is that the benefits of marriage are likely to be unevenly distrib-
uted among same-sex couples. Nitya Duclos, a Canadian scholar, has
argued, for example, that the rules of marriage would primarily benefit
164. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 34, 35, 75, 139-42. For a recent
general discussion of the recognition of nonmarital relationships in the United States,
see Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1447-
56.
165. See The Danish Registered Partnership Act, No. 372 (1989); Norwegian Act
on Registered Partnerships for Homosexual Couples (1993).
166. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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lesbians and gay men who are members of the middle class - "those
who are already fairly high up in the hierarchy of privilege."' 167 She
does not argue that this lopsided allocation of benefits is a reason not to
permit same-sex marriage, for surely it is not, but rather is a reason to
be less exultant about what will be achieved by it.'
68
Duclos may possibly be right. Those high in the hierarchy of privi-
lege usually come out ahead. Still, at least in this country, many lower-
income same-sex couples will find great benefits in marriage. Duclos
claims that "[t]hose who rely for most of their income on state benefits
are more likely [than middle class persons] to be economically penal-
ized for marrying,"' 169 and it is true that a significant cost of marriage
for some lower-income persons who marry a working person is the loss
of governmental benefits, such as Medicaid or Supplemental Security
Income. 70 It is also true that some other rules, such as those exempting
bequests to a spouse from the estate and gift taxes, are of value only to
those who have large sums to give away. Still, there may be compensat-
ing gains for low income persons. Social Security retirement benefits
for a nonworking spouse and Social Security survivor benefits are of
most importance to those without long ties to the formal economy.
Medical benefits tied to employment - including employment of some
low-earning government employees - are of immense significance to
spouses with jobs that carry no health coverage at all. And other bene-
fits, such as the immigration rules or rules that relate to intestate suc-
cession, are likely to be at least as frequently invoked by the people of
modest incomes as they are by the well-heeled. It is impossible for all
sorts of reasons to make a confident prediction of what class-groups
among gay men and lesbians would benefit most from being permitted
to marry, but there is ample reason to believe that the rules relating to
marriage will be appealing to many people of all classes.
A final criticism of the laws bearing on married persons is more
fundamental: even if legal marriage would offer benefits to a broad
range of same-sex couples, some might claim that all these advantages
are illegitimate - illegitimate for both same-sex and opposite-sex
couples - because they favor persons in two-person units over single
persons and over persons living in groups of three or more, and because
they favor persons linked to one other person in a sexual-romantic rela-
tionship over persons linked to another by friendship or other alle-
167. Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 L. &
SEXUALrrY 31, 55, 58 (1991).
168. Id. at 59.
169. Id. at 55.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
November 1996]
HeinOnline  -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 489 1996-1997
Michigan Law Review
giances17' Those of us who are gay or lesbian must be especially sensi-
tive to these claims. If the deeply entrenched paradigm we are
challenging is the romantically linked man-woman couple, we should
respect the similar claims made against the hegemony of the two-person
unit and against the romantic foundations of marriage.
Governments nonetheless seem justified in favoring a special rela-
tionship with someone known as a spouse over other relationships of
friendship or kinship in those contexts in which friendship or kinship
alone rarely leads to the sorts of intermingling of assets or joint under-
takings to raise children that commonly occur for persons who regard
themselves as long-term lovers or spouses. Most of the rules for forced
sharing of property or for advantages in adoption rest on perceptions of
the understandings and desires of the enduring couple that much less
often aptly apply to relationships with friends or other kin. Still, there
are many occasions when greater recognition should be permitted for
friendship or other kinship relations than currently obtains. Two siblings
who live together and who have raised a deceased sibling's child ought
to be eligible, for example, to adopt the child. A single person ought to
be able to register a person as a special friend and obtain at least some
benefits now provided for a spouse. Under the Federal Family and
Medical Leave Act, for example, a single, childless person currently has
no right to take time off to care for someone he loves other than a par-
ent. A system of advance registration of a friend for whose care the
statutory privilege would extend seems both feasible and desirable.
As to the privileging of the two-person romantic unit of husband
and wife over romantically linked units of other sizes, I am equally
queasy. Rather few such cohabiting relationships of three or more ap-
pear to exist in this country, whether for mixed-sex or same-sex
groups. 72 Reasons can be offered why the state should recognize the
two-person marriage but not.the marriage of three or more, but I do not
wish to try. In the end, most of the reasons are logistical and soluble. 7 3
If the law of marriage can be seen as facilitating the opportunities of
two people to live an emotional life that they find satisfying - rather
171. See WESTON, supra note 46, at 209-10; Homer, supra note 11, at 530; Jaff,
supra note 90, at 238-42.
172. I've always been surprised that there were not more three and more person
cohabiting units among gay men and lesbians, since homosexual people are, after all,
already flouting convention when living together in pairs.
173. Justifiable limits could, for example, be placed on the number of spouses one
could bring into the country on a privileged basis. Rules could be fashioned for the di-
vision of assets among three or four people who are splitting.
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than as imposing a view of proper relationships - the law ought to be
able to achieve the same for units of more than two.
However, the fact that the state unwisely ignores or prohibits cer-
tain relationships in addition to those of lesbian and gay couples does
not make it inappropriate to advocate for the recognition of gay and les-
bian couple relationships today. Nearly all reform to correct disparate
treatment in our society is incremental. It comes at points at which the
state finally recognizes the legitimacy of the claims of some long disfa-
vored group. Thus, within this century, governments have gradually
changed their posture toward the legal position of the child born outside
of marriage and toward unmarried opposite-sex couples in their rela-
tionships with one another.
A next appropriate step is the step discussed in this article - the
recognition of same-sex couples who wish to marry. And although it is
conceivable, as some have feared, that permitting gay people to marry
will simply reinforce the enshrined position of married two-person units
in general in our society, it seems at least as likely that the effect of
permitting same-sex marriage will be to make society more receptive to
the further evolution of the law.174 By ceasing to conceive of marriage
as a partnership composed of one person of each sex, the state may be-
come more receptive to units of three or more (all of which, of course,
include at least two persons of the same sex) and to units composed of
two people of the same sex but who are bound by friendship alone. All
desirable changes in family law need not be made at once.
174. See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, I L. &
SnxuALrry 9, 12 (1991).
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